The number of widows is increasing with population ageing and their in ‡uence on the housing market is getting larger. This paper investigates the e¤ect of widowhood on housing and location choices. A partner's death induces a decrease in income which may lead to downsizing. Widowhood may also reveal new preferences, such as the need to be close to care givers and health services. We estimate the e¤ect of a transition to widowhood on housing consumption and location choices using the French Housing Surveys. Widowhood signi…cantly increases residential mobility, especially at older ages and when having children.
Introduction
As the population is ageing, governments are concerned with the …nancing of pensions, as well as the costs of health and care services. In this context, widowhood is getting important with the arrival of large baby-boom cohorts at the age of widowhood (Kalogirou and Murphy, 2006) .
Widowhood a¤ects welfare in many ways. It a¤ects income and living standards as the survivor's pension is smaller than the partner's income. Housing accounts for an important share of the budget and its consumption presents economies of scales that are lost when the partner dies. For this reason a surviving spouse may want to downsize. Widowhood also a¤ects living arrangements.
It is well documented that a fair amount of care to disabled elderly people is provided by a spouse, who is most often the wife (Chappell, 1991 , Freedman, 1996 . Obviously a widow has no careproviding spouse in case of need. She has to turn to other family members or to professionals …nanced by private or public insurance. The issue of long term care is linked to the housing choices of the oldest old, as they choose between accommodation in nursing homes or personal care in their own dwelling. As the number of widows is expected to increase in the near future, the consequences on the housing market may be important. We study the residential mobility, housing and location choices of recent widows and widowers. Do they downsize? Do they relocate?
Our goal is to get some indirect evidence on the impact of the residential mobility of widows on the housing market and to what extent widows may rely on kinship for support.
Quite surprisingly, the mobility and housing choices of the elderly have not often been analyzed in the economic literature except in a few empirical papers (Venti and Wise, 1989; Ermisch and Jenkins, 1999; Venti and Wise, 2001; Tatsiramos, 2004; Laferrère, 2005 and . These studies adopt a broad view, looking at the e¤ect of all shocks -job change, retirement, widowhoodon mobility. They also analyze the variations in housing characteristics and location as a move occurs. However, they do not usually disentangle the various causes of mobility. Hence, the results are generated by a mix of several economic and socio-demographic e¤ects. Conversely, the literature on widowhood does not look much at mobility (with the exception of Chevan, 1995) and housing choices. It mostly studies the living arrangement of widows at a given point in time and not its dynamics (Macunovich et al., 1995 , Costa, 1999 , Iacovou, 2000 . The present paper tries to reconcile the two approaches and explain how widowhood can lead to mobility, housing 2 adjustments and relocation.
We propose a two-period model to show how the changes in income and preferences due to widowhood may a¤ect housing and location choices. In fact, when a partner dies, the loss of income is only partly compensated by a survivor pension, while the housing cost per capita doubles. This encourages downsizing. Besides, as a widow cannot bene…t from the help of a partner, she may anticipate the need to get a better access to care especially at an older age. This can be done by getting closer to her children or to places where services are easily available such as large cities.
We assess the importance of these mechanisms in an empirical section using data from the French Housing Surveys.
We …nd that a transition to widowhood has a signi…cant positive impact on residential mobility, especially at older ages. Ceteris paribus, when one of the spouses dies, the probability of moving within the next four years is nearly 90% higher than if no death occurred. A widow is more likely to be mobile if she has children than if she is childless. Mobile widows tend to live closer to their relatives even if moves to co-reside with a child are extremely rare. Compared to mobile couples, mobile recent widows are more likely to decrease their number of rooms and to choose the rental sector. They also switch more often from a single family house to an apartment. Finally they move more often to larger cities. These results on housing and location adjustments are consistent with moves to get closer to health services and care for single elderly people.
Section 2 provides descriptive statistics and discusses some institutional features of widowhood in France. In section 3, we present the two-period model that analyzes the e¤ect of a transition to widowhood on housing and location choices. We then test some of the mechanisms on data from the 1996 and 2002 French Housing Surveys, which are described in section 4. Section 5 delineates our empirical …ndings. Section 6 concludes.
The French setting
We now present some stylized facts on widowhood after age 60. Figure 1 shows the proportion of widows and widowers by age, for …ve birth cohorts. The proportion increases with age, and is always much larger for women than for men. The di¤erence can be explained by the higher death rate of men and by the age di¤erence between spouses, as wives are on average 2:5 years younger than their husbands. For instance, for women born in 1920, the rate of widowhood at age 80 is 60 percent, more than 3 times the rate for men (17 percent) . This means that a large majority of married men live with their spouses until death whereas a large majority of women spend part of their life as widows. This justi…es our use of the word "widow" instead of "widow or widower" in this paper. At a younger age, the rate of widowhood also decreases from one cohort to the other. This is due to the general increase in life expectancy which makes widowhood occur later in the life-cycle.
The death of a spouse induces a fall in the household resources as it goes with the loss of the partner's income. To compensate for this loss, widows in many countries are eligible for social security bene…ts in the form of a survivor pension (see Burkhauser and alii, 2005) . In France the average survivor pension is roughly 55 percent of the deceased spouse's pension. Hence, in many cases, the survivor pension would not fully compensate for the income loss related to widowhood. It is not possible to compute the change in income due to widowhood using the French Housing Surveys. Nevertheless, we can recover some indirect information from the average income of cohorts as a function of the age of the household head (see Figure 2 ).
[Insert F igure 2]
A striking fact is that the average income does not decrease after age 70. This is surprising at a …rst glance because many couples experience the death of one partner at that age (see Figure 1 ). This income stability may be generated by three main mechanisms:
First, as we mentioned above, the surviving spouse gets a survivor pension that is designed 1 Deaths among non legally married couples are not recorded as widowhood. The bias in negligible for the current cohorts aged 60 or more. But for the future generations where lasting partnerships exist outside marriages, a new word may have to be found for widowhood.
2 Suppose for example that the husband receives a pension P H and the wife has no pension. After the husband's death, the survivor pension will be 55 percent of P H . With the most commonly used equivalence scale, the living standard of the surviving spouse will decrease from 0; 7P H (ie.
) to 0; 55 P H ; that is to say by about 21%. If we assume that the woman received P F equal to one third of P H , the decrease in the living standard will be roughly 10%.
to help him/her keep the same living standards. This survivor pension may be complemented with the extraction of income from assets after the partner's death.
Second, mortality rates at older ages vary with education and income level. The life expectancy of the lowest income groups is lower and on average they die …rst (Jusot, 2004) .
Hence, there is a selection e¤ect as the proportion of high income households increases with age.
Third, some poor widows may move to sheltered housing or nursing homes. They are excluded from our sample. 3 Delbès and Gaymu (2005) …nd that entry in retirement home is more likely for low-income groups.
Actually, living in an institution is rare below age 80, and so is co-residing with children (Flipo, Le Blanc and Laferrère, 1999) . Widows aged between 60 and 85 years old mainly live independently (see Figure 3 ). Above 85, entries into nursing homes increase quickly. Nearly one third of widows between 90 and 94 years old are institutionalized (Delbès and Gaymu, 2005) .
Widowhood can also in ‡uence a surviving spouse's wealth because of the rules governing marriage property and inheritance. Under the French marriage law, 4 all assets acquired during marriage are held in common, that is, half of them belong to each spouse. Hence after a death, half of the couple's common property belongs to the surviving spouse, but the other half is transmitted by bequest. In the presence of children, a surviving spouse is not the only one to inherit her partner's property, as the children also inherit the property. Consequently, a surviving spouse may have to share with her children the property of the dwelling that she used with her husband. Usually, the transfer of ownership rights to the children does not change much for the widowed mother who can go on using her home. But depending on the overall size of the bequest, she can be forced out of her home. Typically if the couple's only asset was the home, the children might put some pressure 3 More precisely, only part of retirement homes and dwellings for the elderly are categorized as ordinary homes and included in the French Housing Surveys used for Figure 2 . These are mainly dwellings for non-disabled elderly. Each spouse's utility function U depends on the ‡ow of services derived from housing F and on the consumption of a composite good C chosen as a numeraire: U = U (C; F ). A uni-dimensional index K summarizes all the features of housing related to quality and quantity. For simplicity, we label it housing quantity. The ‡ow of housing services is denoted c (K), where the subscript c stands for life in couple. The ‡ow is an increasing function of the quantity index. This function also accounts for many characteristics of housing consumption as explained in Nelson (1988) . Firstly, it captures economies of scale in consumption, as housing is a partially public good. Secondly, there can be increasing returns in the household production of goods and services. For instance, cooking for two takes less than twice the time of cooking for one. 6 Thirdly, there can be some 5 For a dwelling, the usufruct is the right to use it. For a …nancial asset or a housing investment, it is its return.
Since 2001, the survivor has a life interest in the deceased spouse's property even in the absence of a will. 6 Another type of scale economies mentioned by Nelson (1988) are scale economies in price. They exist when the marginal cost of dwelling is a decreasing function of its quantity. In our framework (as in Nelson, 1988 from 6 positive complementarity e¤ects from sharing a home. One may enjoy watching television with a partner more than alone. Moreover, some tasks, like gardening, may be performed better by one of the spouses rather than the other one.
The utility function can be rewritten: U c (C; K) = U (C; c (K)). The function U c is supposed to be increasing in its two arguments and strictly concave. The additional assumption that
will be used in comparative statics. It is veri…ed for usual utility functions such as Cobb-Douglas and CES, as well as for separable utility functions. We also assume that U c veri…es the Inada conditions to get an interior solution.
In the …rst period, each spouse gets a retirement pension I that is used to consume C in composite good and to pay for housing. Housing consumption is characterized by a non negative housing cost . For owners, the user cost includes the opportunity cost of money invested in the house and the maintenance costs (see Henderson and Ioannides, 1983) . For tenants it is the rent. 7 The couple chooses a dwelling without fully anticipating the death of one partner. For simplicity, there is no transaction cost in period 1. The two partners have the same bargaining power so that their respective levels of welfare count equally in the household's choices. We also assume that they share equally the composite good. The maximization program of the couple is then:
Rewriting the budget constraint as C + 2 K = I, we can see that the program gives the same optimal quantities as for a single individual with utility U c endowed with income I and facing a housing cost twice lower than the couple's cost. We denote the optimum housing capital: K c = K c 2 ; I where the …rst argument is the housing cost per capita and the second is income.
At the end of the …rst period, the husband dies. His widow receives a survivor pension R(I)
indexed on her husband's retirement pension. The housing cost per capita doubles taking the which it is very close), scale economies in price are formally equivalent to scale economies in consumption. We do not insist on them as they remain the same when one partner dies. By contrast, scale economies in consumption disappear. 7 Owners may get a positive return from housing if the housing prices increase enough: < 0. In that case, housing should be thought of as an asset entering a portfolio (see Bruekner, 1997; Flavin and Yamashita, 2002 ).
This case is not taken into account here as we focus only on mechanisms related to a transition to widowhood.
value . The housing service ‡ow changes. The new service ‡ow function is denoted w (K) where the subscript w stands for widowed. It is still an increasing function of the housing quantity index. There are several reasons why may change after widowhood. On the one hand, possible congestion disappears. Extra rooms may also yield additional bene…ts if the widow needs visitors to overcome loneliness. These mechanisms have a positive e¤ect on the service ‡ow for a given housing quantity. On the other hand, complementarity e¤ects with the partner, scale economies in consumption, and increasing return in housing production disappear. These have a negative e¤ect on the service ‡ow for a given housing quantity. We conjecture that, overall, negative e¤ects usually prevail. We thus assume that the marginal rate of substitution M RS between housing and the composite good is reduced after widowhood: M RS w < M RS c .
In the second period, the widow chooses between staying in the dwelling and moving. If she stays, she cannot adjust her housing consumption to her new preferences and constraints. If she moves, she can make such adjustments but she incurs a moving cost D. This cost includes monetary costs like transportation or brokers'fees. It also includes the utility decrease, assumed to have a monetary equivalent, arising from the loss of a local social network, the loss of local information, and the pain of leaving a familiar environment.
We denote by U w (C; K) = U (C; w (K)) the widow's utility function with the same standard assumptions as for U c . The widow maximizes her utility under the budget constraint. We assume that the user cost is the same as in the …rst period. 8 The maximization program can be decomposed in two stages. For each option, staying and moving, the widow computes her optimal utility. She then chooses the option yielding the highest utility. 9 If she stays, her housing consumption index remains at K c and her consumption of the composite good is given by the second-stage budget constraint: C = I + R (I) K c . This option is valid only if the widow can pay for the housing cost with her new income: K c < I + R (I). In some cases, the survivor cannot bear the housing cost anymore, so she has to move. This occurs when the income I + R (I) is between K c =2 and
It is an important policy issue for the low income elderly. In case of ownership, the elderly 8 The extension of the model to a change in user cost is straightwforward and yields additional price e¤ects.
9 For simplicity, we do not model the tenure choice as it has been studied extensively in the literature and is not speci…c to widowhood. This tenure choice rests mainly on the relative user costs and utility bene…ts of ownership and rental, as well as the existence of borrowing constraints (see Gobillon and Le Blanc, 2004 , for a modelization in a two-period framework similar to ours). We keep these mechanisms in mind for the empirical section.
8 may try to decrease the maintenance costs to avoid being income constrained. Evidence for the US suggests that the elderly spend less money in maintenance costs than younger homeowners (Davido¤, 2006) . This type of mechanism is not included in our model but it could be taken into account by assuming that the owner's user cost is endogenous.
In case of a residential move, the maximisation program writes:
slc :
The optimal housing quantity is denoted:
The moving decision follows a (s; S) rule when the moving cost is small enough and variations in housing quantity can yield signi…cant changes in utility. 10 In that case, there is an inaction band around the housing consumption of the …rst period. If the optimal housing consumption of the widow stands within this band, it is not worth adjusting housing because of moving costs.
If the optimal housing consumption stands outside the band, moving allows to make a housing adjustment that more than compensates the moving cost.
We now focus on the change in the housing consumption index in case of mobility. The di¤erence in optimal housing quantity between the two periods can be decomposed as follows:
The signs of the e¤ects are easy to derive (see Appendix 1). First, there is a negative income e¤ect due to moving costs. This e¤ect is usually larger for owners than for renters as their moving costs are usually higher. These is also an impact of the decrease in resources from 2I to I + R (I) that can be decomposed into two parts. There is a positive income e¤ect as the survivor pension increases the income per head from I to I + R (I). There is also a negative price e¤ect arising from the fact that the user cost of housing per head doubles from 2 to . The sum of these two e¤ects is likely to be negative as income per head less than doubles whereas housing cost per head doubles.
Finally, the preference e¤ect is negative as the service ‡ow from housing decreases and housing becomes less valuable after widowhood. The di¤erence K w K c is likely to be in ‡uenced by other factors not included in the model. First, couples may anticipate the death of one partner and choose their home as a compromise between their optimal choice when living together as a couple and when living alone. The model can be extended to integrate this feature in an inter-temporal framework. The utility function in the …rst period would be a weighted sum of the utility of the couple and the utility of a widow. In that case, housing adjustments in the second period are less likely.
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The decomposition (3) and the analysis which goes along suggest that downsizing is likely. We test it empirically below.
Location decision
So far, we have assumed that housing consumption could be summarized by a single index K.
However housing has many dimensions. A major aspect is location. Places di¤er in amenities such as climate, or cultural goods. More importantly in our context, they di¤er in access to services.
When living together, the two partners choose a common location according to their preferences.
When one of them dies, the survivor may relocate according to her own new preferences and constraints. Among changes in preferences, an important aspect is closeness to friends and relatives, as well as access to services and care providers. We now extend the model to jointly study the housing and location adjustments.
Consider two locations a and b with di¤erent housing costs. In our context, a can be thought of as a rural area or a small town, and b as a large city providing services and shops, or as the place where the children live. For location`2 fa; bg, the housing cost is denoted (`). In the …rst period, the couple chooses the consumption of housing and of the composite good, as well as a location. Each partner's utility depends on the location`and writes U c (C; K;`). For a 11 Also, partners may have di¤erent preferences and di¤erent bargaining power in the decisions taken within the couple. Then, a transition to widowhood might reveal the individual's own preferences and change the optimal housing index in the second period.
…xed`, the utility function is strictly concave in (C; K) and veri…es the Inada conditions. The maximization program can be decomposed in two stages. First, the couple computes its optimal utility in each location`:
Then, the couple chooses the location`c yielding the highest utility. Without loss of generality, we suppose that the location at optimum is a (the small town).
In the second period, the widow may stay in her dwelling or move depending on the welfare provided by the two options. If she stays, she cannot adjust her housing quantity (see the previous section). If she moves, she can choose both her location and housing quantity. For simplicity, we suppose that the moving costs are the same whatever the location she chooses. Denote U w (C; K;`) the widow's utility function in a given location`. 12 For this location, the optimal utility is given by:
The optimal location when moving is the one yielding the highest utility.
In this setting, the transition to widowhood reveals the new individual preferences for housing and location. The widow may relocate if her new preferences make her prefer b to a. The location b could be closer to her family or could become more attractive because of better service accessibility.
Interestingly, the location choice itself may induce a decrease in the housing quantity. This happens if the widow wants to relocate to a large city and the housing cost in the rural area is lower than in the large city:
Location is only one of many dimensions of housing. Other dimensions are the number of rooms, equipment, and whether the dwelling is an apartment or a house. Besides, the local housing market is di¤erent in a rural area and in a large city. There are usually more apartment buildings and less single-family houses in cities, and dwellings are more often for rent. Hence, a new widow located in a rural area who owns a house is likely to rent an apartment if she moves to a city. Note that choosing to own may be less attractive as one ages, as one has less time to recover the cost of investment. This would induce older movers, widowed or not, to choose to rent rather than own.
The empirical section will investigate the housing adjustments in location, size, dwelling type and tenure status.
The data
Our theoretical model has several empirical implications for mobility and housing adjustments after widowhood. To test them, we need information on residential and family history, as well as on the characteristics of the former and current accommodation. the population. These cross-section surveys are designed to study residential mobility. They o¤er a large choice of retrospective questions on the housing situation four years before the survey date, as well as questions on whether a move occurred within the last four years and the reasons for this move. The data also include some information on the usual socio-demographic characteristics of individuals and their detailed income. Importantly, the 2002 Housing survey also provides the total number of children outside the parents'home, which is likely to be an important element of preferences and constraints.
We de…ne a mobile household as one who changed homes within the last four years before the survey date. We restrict the sample to households whose head is retired or inactive and was aged between 60 and 85 four years before the survey date. The exclusion of those who are employed is meant to decrease transitions on the labor market that can lead to residential mobility without any 13 In the US Panel Study on Income Dynamics (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) , the German Socio-Economic Panel (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) , the British Household Panel (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) and the Canadian Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (1993-2000) , roughly 571, 345, 197 and 633 females aged 50 years old and over experience a transition to widowhood (Burkhauser and alii, 2005) .
link to widowhood. 14 The exclusion of the oldest old is meant to minimize entries in nursing and elderly homes that increase after age 80 but are not frequent before age 85 (Delbès and Gaymu, 2005 , and Figure 3 ). We impose this exclusion because most of those living in institutions are excluded from the sample.
The surveys provide no direct information on matrimonial status four years before the survey date, but current status and the number of household members are known. Hence, a transition to widowhood is de…ned in the following way: a person is widowed and lives alone at the survey date, and the number of household members decreased from two to one during the four years before the survey. experienced the loss of a spouse. Note that widowhood is less frequent at earlier ages but is more frequent at later ages in the 2002 FHS than in the 1996 FHS. As was noted for the cohort e¤ect in Figure 1 , these di¤erences are related to the fast increase in life expectancy that makes widowhood 14 This exclusion does not avoid the e¤ect of retirement on mobility that would occur after retirement. However only 8 mobile households gave this reason for their move in our sample (see Table 9 ). 15 In the 1996 FHS, 103 males and 338 females experience widowhood. In the 2002 FHS, the corresponding …gures are 144 males and 431 females. 16 Also, the period covered by longitudinal surveys is often longer and behaviors may change over time.
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happen later in the life cycle.
[Insert T able 2]
In what follows, the date of the survey (1996 or 2002) is labeled t and the date four years before is labeled t 1. We de…ne six non-overlapping types of family situations from marital status and shocks on household composition:
(1) "Couples": two people living together in t 1, whether they are legally married or not 17 and still living together in t.
(2) "Single or divorced": a person living alone in t 1, and single or divorced in t.
(3) "Widows": a person living alone in t 1, and widowed and living alone in t.
(4) "3 people and more": households with more than two members in t 1.
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(5) "Recently widowed": a person living with a partner as a couple in t 1, and widowed and living alone in t.
(6) "Recently separated": a person living with a partner as a couple in t 1, and divorced and living alone in t.
Whereas couples are the largest group and account for 42 percent of the sample in 2002, stable widows are the second largest group at 26 percent. The percentage of recently widowed is 8 percent.
19 Table 3 gives the residential mobility rates for each of the six types. Leaving aside the few who have recently divorced, recently widowed have the highest mobility rate. Indeed their rate is 13:3 percent in 2002, more than twice the rate of couples. Interestingly, the mobility rate of stable widows is also far smaller (7:9 percent) than when widowhood is recent. It suggests that when widowhood induces mobility, it is mostly in the four years after the partner's death.
[Insert T able 3]
17 Most of the time, two people over 60 years old living together are married.
18 This group includes some couples with children who experience the death of one of the partners. We do not distinguish them as we focus on transitions to widowhood for households with only two members. 19 We exclude the couples who recently separated in the rest of the analysis, as they represent only 1 percent of our sample, which is too small to identify speci…c e¤ects for them.
14 5 Empirical results
Mobility
The theoretical section suggested several mechanisms which can make recently widowed more mobile than couples. We now assess empirically the e¤ect of being recently widowed on mobility.
We estimate a probit model of mobility where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one in case of a move and zero otherwise. Di¤erences in mobility between family types are captured by four dummies, each corresponding to one of the family categories (2)- (5) home in our regressions. 20 Beside the usual socio-demographic preferences shifters (age, sex and education), we include housing and location variables. Housing tenure and housing type are used as proxies for mobility costs, dwelling quality, and long term adequation to needs. The population size of the municipality (less than 1,000 inhabitants; 1,000-5,000; 5,000-10,000; 10,000-50,000; and more than 50,000) captures e¤ects related to the structure of the housing market.
Finally, the theory suggests that the income level after the partner's death may a¤ect mobility.
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On the one hand, income can have a positive e¤ect as it helps to …nance moving costs. On the other hand, it can have a negative e¤ect because low-income recently widowed may be unable to pay for their housing expenditure and are then forced to downsize. The overall e¤ect on mobility is an empirical issue and the theoretical arguments given above suggest that it may be non linear.
We …rst introduced income and its square in our probit regression. The e¤ect of income was found to be inverse U-shaped with the vast majority of observed households being on the increasing part of the parabola (the maximum of the parabola being as high as 86; 000 euros). Hence, the 20 As the only FHS to provide information on the number of independent children is the one conducted in 2002, we only use that survey. 21 Theory would suggest studying the e¤ect of the variation in income due to the partner's death on the mobility of recently widowed. However, we only have information on income at the survey date and not four years before.
We thus cannot compute the variation in income from the data. This means that the dummy for being recently widowed will capture the e¤ect of the income variation on mobility.
income e¤ect is positive and nearly linear, and we stick to a linear speci…cation (in log). Income after widowhood might be endogenous since new mobile widows may sell a dwelling, invest in a …nancial asset and get some extra income. To overcome this di¢ culty, we instrument income after widowhood with the overall pension of the recently widowed, that includes both her own pension and the survivor pension. This pension is …xed by the law from the level of incomes of the two partners before retirement and is thus exogenous. Table A in Appendix 3 reports the results of the …rst-stage instrumental equation. Our …nal speci…cation is an IV probit.
Our …rst speci…cation tests for di¤erences in mobility between family categories (Table 4 , column 1). Single or divorced, as well as recently widowed, are found to be more mobile than couples. In fact, recently widowed are the most mobile. Ceteris paribus, their probability of moving is nearly 90% higher than for couples. Note that those who have been widowed for more than four years have a propensity to move similar to couples. This suggests that if a move occurs because of widowhood, it is likely to happen just after the death of the partner. This result is in line with that obtained on the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics (Chevan, 1995) .
Mobility is also found to be decreasing with age, except at older ages where it levels o¤.
Education has no signi…cant e¤ect. This is not surprising since residential mobility related to the education choices would have occurred sooner in the life-cycle. The positive e¤ect of income on mobility is in line with the need to pay for moving costs but not with liquidity constraints that would force a move to reduce housing costs. Note that income is only weakly endogenous since all coe¢ cients are very similar whether instrumenting or not (see the results of a simple probit in Table B in Appendix 3 for comparison). Interestingly, those who have children are signi…cantly more mobile than those who are childless. This result is consistent with a story where parents would relocate closer to their children either to get some support (Ogg and Renaut, 2005 , Glaser and Tomassini, 2000 , Laditka and Laditka, 2001 or to take care of their grand-children. The e¤ect of tenure is also in line with expectations. Owners are less mobile than tenants, probably because they have to incur large transaction costs and because ownership allows to better customize the occupied dwelling. We also …nd the usual result for France that private-sector tenants are more mobile than public housing tenants (Gobillon, 2001) . Indeed, public housing tenants pay rents that are lower than in the private sector and would loose this bene…t when moving. Living in a single family house has a negative e¤ect on mobility, probably because it usually goes along with higher quality. There is also a positive e¤ect of living in a large municipality (more than 50; 000 inhabitants) on mobility, maybe because it makes easier to …nd an accommodation more adapted to new needs close to the previous dwelling. Finally the number of excess rooms, de…ned as the number of rooms minus the number of persons, has no signi…cant e¤ect on mobility.
To shed more light on the speci…c behavior and constraints of the newly widowed, we then run separate probits for three di¤erent family categories: couples, stable and single widows, and newly widowed (Table 4 , columns 2 to 4). Interestingly, the age pro…le and the e¤ect of children are very di¤erent for the recently widowed. Recently widowed are more mobile when they get above 80, contrary to couples and stable widows. This is consistent with housing adjustments triggered by health problems after the age of 80. While someone living in couple can rely on a spouse for care and stay at home, an older widow may have to move to get care. She may want to relocate closer to her children or to a place where health services and medical care are more accessible.
Having children has a positive e¤ect on the propensity to move (signi…cant at 10%) only for recently widowed, and has no e¤ect for couples and stable widows. It is hard to disentangle the reasons for this positive e¤ect: it may point to the need for family support at close range, or to some pressure by children at the time of inheritance. Indeed, some of the moves may be due to the necessity of sharing the deceased parent's bequest. The pressure is likely to be more important for widows than for widowers because the women of the cohorts we studied might own fewer personal assets than their husbands. Consistent with this idea, we …nd that widows are more likely to move than widowers. A more convincing test would be to interact the children dummy with the sex dummy. Unfortunately the sample has not enough recent childless widowers to get convincing results. Females are more a¤ected by disabilities than males of the same age (Cambois et al., 2003) . The signi…cant positive e¤ect of the female dummy is thus also compatible with their having, or anticipating, more health problems.
The number of excess rooms has a positive e¤ect for widows but not for couples. This may be a sign of the …nancial burden of a large dwelling. The next subsection analyzes the housing choices of movers and will bring some additional elements pointing at widows being income constrained.
[Insert T able 4]
Housing choices of mobile widows
The theoretical model shows that recent widowhood can lead to an adjustment in housing con- Table 5 .
Conditionally on moving, the number of excess rooms has a positive e¤ect on downsizing and a negative e¤ect on upsizing. Hence, the disequilibrium in number of rooms tends to be corrected by the move. 22 More income induces upsizing (signi…cant at 10%). This might be a hint that the wealthiest are less forced into decreasing their housing consumption because of a budget constraint. Whereas mobile recent widows are more likely to downsize than moving couples, there is no signi…cant di¤erence for upsizing. This result is consistent with our theoretical expectations.
[Insert T able 5]
We also examine the change in the dwelling type (apartment/house) for moving households. The proportion of recent widows living in an apartment doubles after a move. Whereas only 36 percent of them lived in an apartment four years before the survey date (i.e. before the move), they are 73 percent at the survey date (i.e. after the move). By comparison, the increase is negligible for couples: 45 percent of them live in an apartment before the move and 47 percent after the move. We check that this result still holds when controlling for our set of explanatory variables.
We de…ne two subsamples depending on the dwelling type (apartment or house) before the move.
For each subsample, we estimate a logit model of housing type after the move (i.e. at the survey date). Results are reported in Table 6 . As expected, among house occupiers, recently widowed are more likely to get into an apartment than couples. So are stable widows, as well as single and 22 This …nding is similar to that obtained for retiring French households by Gobillon and Wol¤ (2007) . divorced individuals. Moves towards apartments signi…cantly increase with age until 80. This is not surprising as living in a house usually goes along with more costs and maintenance tasks to be performed individually, while they are taken care of collectively in apartment buildings. As one ages, such tasks become more di¢ cult to perform. Also, single family houses in France are mostly located far from town centers where shops and health services are usually located. Moving from a house to an apartment may grant the elderly living on their own better access to these services.
[Insert T able 6]
In the same line, we investigate the e¤ect of being widowed on a change in housing tenure for movers. Among moving owners, we expect recent widows to switch more often to the rental sector than couples as owning is harder to deal with for a single person because of maintenance tasks and paperwork. Indeed, among recent widows, 51 percent of owners switch to renting when they move. Conversely, only 18 percent of renters switch to owning. The proportions for couples are respectively 19 percent and 29 percent. As previously, we test whether our results are robust when controlling for our set of explanatory variables. For each tenure mode before the move (renting or owning), we estimate a logit model of housing tenure after the move. The results con…rm that widows, whether recent or not, switch more often from owning to renting than couples. This is consistent with widows desiring to simplify housing management and with moves toward town centers where the rental market is more developed. It could also result from estate sharing following the spouse's death (see section 2 on the in ‡uence of inheritance laws). We also …nd that both for previous tenants and owners, having excess rooms increases the propensity to be the owner of the new dwelling. This suggests that households with excess rooms are wealthier and can a¤ord to own (remember that we control only for income and not for wealth). For tenants, income has a negative e¤ect on remaining in the rental sector, which suggests that access to ownership is still possible for the elderly who have enough income.
Interestingly, among recent widows who move from owning to renting, one third chooses the public sector. In fact, the public sector is quite attractive as it provides some homes adapted to the elderly.
[Insert T able 7]
Finally, we test whether recent widows are likely to move to larger municipalities where health and other services are more easily available. Municipality size is measured by the 1999 Census population which was added to our dataset using a restricted access municipality code. We expect recent widows to move more often to larger cities than couples. In fact, among movers, 40% of recent widows move to a larger municipality whereas this proportion is only 28% for couples. Conversely, only 17% of recent widows move to a smaller municipality whereas this proportion climbs to 28% for couples. We test whether these results still hold ceteris paribus by estimating a multinomial logit on the subsample of movers with three categories: moving within the current municipality (reference), moving to a larger municipality and moving to a smaller municipality. As expected from the theory, recent widows move more often to larger cities than couples. Interestingly, this is not the case for widows, and single or divorced individuals. They may have adjusted their location to living on their own earlier. We also …nd that being a recent widow decreases the chances to move to a smaller municipality compared to couples, but the e¤ect is not signi…cant. Overall, the results are consistent with widows moving to larger municipalities where there are more services. Using a …le linking each municipality with local services (the so-called 1998 Municipal Inventory), it was possible to check that a larger size of the municipality goes along with more shops, care and health services.
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[Insert T able 8]
According to the theoretical section, being widowed can lead to a relocation for reasons related to preferences. These reasons can be investigated empirically by using the direct questions on the motives for moving which recent movers were asked in the survey. More than one reason could be given. Among identi…able reasons (i.e. answers di¤erent from "other reason"), recently widowed give two main reasons for their move: they wanted to live close to relatives or to their birthplace (25:9 percent), and they wished to reduce the dwelling size (17:5 percent) (see Table   9 ). By contrast, getting closer to relatives or birthplace is far less mentioned by couples (12:1 percent) and stable widows (15:3 percent). These two groups rather mention reasons related to the environment, or the size and quality of the dwelling. However, whereas stable widows still want to downsize quite often (12:1 percent) this is not the case of couples (4:9 percent). It must be noted that more than one …fth of mobile recently widowed declared moving for "another reason". Laferrère (2005) observes that this type of answer increases with age and suggests that it could 23 Descriptive statistics on this topic are available upon request.
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re ‡ect health-related reasons.
[Insert T able 9]
If living closer to the relatives is the main reason given by recent widows for moving, we may wonder how close widows get to their children. This can be investigated using the 2002 Housing Survey which asks for the distance from the independent children. We …nd that mobile recent widows usually live very close to their children at the survey date. 84:5 percent of mobile recent widows live less than 25 kilometers from a child (Table 10 ). Recent widows who did not move are fewer in that case (71:8 percent). By contrast, the …gures are lower for couples (at 61:1% and 69:6% respectively). This suggests that recent widows want to live close to their children. 24 We could verify that ceteris paribus, mobile recent widows live closer to a child than mobile couples (Table 10) . Living closer to a child is a means to get more care. Using European data from SHARE, Fontaine et al. (2007) have stressed the importance of children to a widowed parent.
They show how the siblings step in to take care of a widowed disabled parent.
[Insert T able 10]
Conclusion
We studied the e¤ect of widowhood on mobility, housing and location choices. As the number of widows is going to increase with the baby-boomers getting older, their choices are likely to have an impact in the near future both on the housing market and on the way care to the elderly is …nanced and delivered. We …rst tried to disentangle the factors which can a¤ect the behaviour of new widows with a simple theoretical model. In fact, widowhood has an e¤ect both on income and housing preferences. Indeed, the loss of the spouse's income is only partly compensated for by the survivor pension whereas housing cost per capita doubles. Moreover, a widow looses the housing externalities and the care from her partner. These two types of mechanisms can trigger mobility. Preferences for locations also change as widows may want to get closer to their children or to large cities where health services are more easily accessible. As the housing markets in cities are di¤erent, with more rental appartments and less owner occupied houses, movers are likely to change the type of their dwelling.
Empirical tests using the French Housing Surveys show that the residential mobility of recent widows is indeed some 90 percent higher than for couples. It is also higher than for stable widows, which suggests than housing adjustments related to widowhood would occur soon after the loss of the spouse. Besides, the mobility of recent widows increases after age 80 and is more likely when they have children, which is not the case for couples. More income always helps to move, including recent widows. When they move, recent widows are more likely than couples to downsize, switch from owning to renting, exchange a single family house for an apartment, and go to a larger municipality. Finally, mobile recent widows tend to live closer to their children than non-mobile ones and couples, even if they seldom co-reside with their children.
Overall, these results suggest that widows downsize to adjust their dwelling to the income loss due to widowhood and to their current or future need for care. Indeed, downsizing usually goes along with a reduction in both the housing costs and housing maintenance tasks. Appartments are also easier to manage than houses, and so is renting compared to owning. Living closer to a child and in a larger city are a means to get more care. The higher residential mobility of the oldest recent widows in our study may point to a need for more care as their health weakens and disabilities increase. The number of mobile widows is going to get larger in the near future and this will have an important e¤ect on the housing market. Indeed, the housing choices of mobile widows will a¤ect the housing supply as more houses will be vacant. They will also a¤ect housing demand for smaller urban apartments.
A limit to our analysis is that we could not separately identify the various channels by which the existence of children may a¤ect the mobility and housing choices of their widowed parent. Indeed, a widow may move either to get closer to care-providing children, or because she has to move out to share the bequest. We found many indirect hints pointing towards care by children. However, it would be interesting to measure how the rules of intergenerational transfer may trigger mobility.
This is left for future research. The rate of transitions to widowhood is defined for the sample of couples (with head aged 60 to 84 and retired or inactive four years before the survey date), as the ratio between the number of couples experiencing a transition to widowhood to the total number of couples. This rate is weighted. Note: sample of households which head is retired or inactive and aged 60 to 84 in (t-1). ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%. 1 Separated from partner, got closer to family or friends, went back to birthplace, looked for a better climate (this item cannot be separated from the preceding reason). 2 Unattractive or insecure neighbourhood, neighbours were unsuitable (too noisy, behavioural problems), too far from town centre and community facilities, wanted to get closer to town centre, wanted to live in a less urbanized place. 3 Wanted a larger/smaller dwelling, the dwelling quality was too bad 4 Wanted to live in a house/in an apartment. 5 Wanted to become owner/tenant, found accommodation that could be used for free 6 Wanted to reduce housing expenses (rent, utilities, maintenance cost) 7 Lived temporarily in the dwelling, was expelled by the owner is given by:
We conduct some comparative statics. Deriving the …rst order conditions, we get:
Using the Cramer's method, we obtain:
These two conditions are su¢ cient to prove the sign of the income and price e¤ects. It is possible to determine the sign of the preference e¤ect using the …rst-order condition (M RS = ). This sign depends on the relative position of the marginal substitution rate when living as a couple and when living in widowhood. It is straightforward to determine this sign using the assumption that: M RS w < M RS c where M RS w (resp. M RS c ) is the marginal rate of substitution when being widowed (resp. living in couple). Note: Sample of households with a head aged 60 to 84, and retired or inactive in 1998. ***: Significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%.
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